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INTRODUCTION
At the conclusion of this Symposium, Professor Louise Trubek
commented that among the myriad topics addressed by scholars, very
little was said about the role of the lawyer in new governance. While
there is some early scholarship discussing the role of lawyers in new
governance,' substantial work remains to be done in outlining and
describing the role of lawyers in a new governance world.2
* Lisa T. Alexander, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin
Law School. Special thanks to Elizabeth Mertz and to my research assistant, Kyra
Olds, for their assistance with this Afterword. I also owe thanks to David and Louise
Trubek for inviting me to serve as a member of the Organizing Committee for this
Symposium.
1. See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, Environmental Lawyering in the Age
of Collaboration, 2002 Wis. L. REV. 555; Orly Lobel, Lawyering Loyalties: Speech
Rights and Duties Within Twenty-First-Century New Governance, 77 FORDHAM L.
REv. 1245 (2009); Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise
of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004);
William H. Simon, Solving Problems vs. Claiming Rights: The Pragmatist Challenge to
Legal Liberalism, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 127 (2004); Susan Sturm, The
Architecture of Inclusion: Advancing Workplace Equity in Higher Education, 29
HARV. J.L. & GENDER 247 (2006) [hereinafter Sturm, Architecture ofInclusion]; Susan
Sturm, Lawyers and the Practice of Workplace Equity, 2002 Wis. L. REV. 277
[hereinafter Sturm, Workplace Equity]; Symposium, Lawyering for a New Democracy,
2002 Wis. L. REV. 271; Louise G. Trubek, Public Interest Lawyers and New
Governance: Advocating for Healthcare, 2002 Wis. L. REV. 575.
2. See Douglas NeJaime, When New Governance Fails, 70 OHIO. ST. L.J.
323, 348-49 (2009) (arguing that lawyers, and public interest lawyers in particular, are
738 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
Significantly, more has been said about the role of courts,' but the
lawyer remains a rather shadowy figure in much new governance
scholarship-shorn of his or her traditional role, but left with little
guidance as to how to proceed in a new world.
While the recent global economic downturn and the change in
power in U.S. government force us to reexamine the efficacy of new
governance approaches to public problem-solving and regulatory
reform, the contributions of Symposium participants affirm that new
governance will likely continue to be with us in the not-so-distant
future. Thus, there is a continuing need to clarify the lawyer's role in
new governance. This Afterword begins that task by (1) reassessing the
core normative goals of much new governance jurisprudence and
practice, analyzing and critiquing the limited role for lawyers
envisioned in this field; (2) positing how lawyers should proceed in a
new governance world while still advancing distributive justice; and (3)
analyzing the implications of these changes for legal education. The
Afterword concludes by outlining further scholarly work that must be
done to help lawyers navigate in a new governance regime.
A. Success and Failure in New Governance
"New governance" is a term that seeks to categorize, describe, and
interpret an increasingly broad range of new developments in
often peripheral to new governance practice and that new governance scholars must
work toward articulating new, or at least reinvented, roles for lawyers).
3. See, e.g., Mark Dawson, Transforming Into What?:- New Governance in
the EU and the "Managerial Sensibility" in Modern Law, 2010 Wis. L. REv. 389;
Helen Hershkoff & Benedict Kingsbury, Crisis, Community, and Courts in Network
Governance: A Response to Liebman and Sabel's Approach to Reform of Public
Education, 28 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 319 (2003); Charles F. Sabel &
William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117
HARV. L. REv. 1016 (2004); Joanne Scott & Susan Sturm, Courts as Catalysts: Re-
Thinking the Judicial Role in New Governance, 13 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 565 (2007);
Kenneth A. Armstrong & David M. Trubek, The Role of the European Court in Public
Law Litigation: Destabilizing Social Sovereignty and Mandating Alternative Processes,
Paper Presented at the University of Wisconsin Law Review Symposium: Transatlantic
Conference on New Governance and the Transformation of Law (Nov. 20-21, 2009)
(on file with author); Tamara Hervey, "Adjudicating in the Shadow of the Informal
Settlement?": The European Court of Justice, "New Governance" and Social Welfare,
Paper Presented at the University of Wisconsin Law Review Symposium: Transatlantic
Conference on New Governance and the Transformation of Law (Nov. 20-21, 2009)
(on file with author); Katharine G. Young, Courts as Catalysts for Economic and Social
Rights: South African Revisions on a New Governance Theme, Paper Presented at the
University of Wisconsin Law Review Symposium: Transatlantic Conference on New
Governance and the Transformation of Law (Nov. 20-21, 2009) (on file with author).
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governance, regulatory reform, and public problem-solving. 4 New
governance clearly encompasses familiar recent governance innovations
such as privatization, devolution, decentralization, public-private
partnerships, and stakeholder collaboration, yet new governance seems
to be more than simply the sum of those innovations. While new
governance has many monikers,' and defies precise definition, there is
a coherence underlying the broad range of scholarship in this
Symposium that gives us a sense that "we know it when we see it."
Yet, because so many Symposium contributors present both successful
and failed examples of new governance, we are forced to examine how
success or failure in new governance is determined. What constitutes
the success or failure of a particular new governance experiment seems
to depend both upon the worldview, or Weltanshauung,' of the scholar
who analyzes it, as well as the scholar's sense of the overall normative
objectives of new governance reform.
Professor Amy Cohen confronts this issue directly in her
Symposium contribution. She explores new governance theory's
normative core and posits that distributive justice is an implied
normative objective in much new governance scholarship.' A review of
the scholarship in this Symposium affirms her observation. For
example, some contributors to this Symposium compare new
governance experiments favorably with previous unsuccessful
regulatory reform efforts, which were mired in litigation, excluded a
4. See Grainne de Birca & Joanne Scott, Introduction: New Governance,
Law and Constitutionalism, in LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US 1,
2 (Grdinne de B~irca & Joanne Scott eds., 2006) ("In a practical sense, the concept of
new governance results from a sharing of experience by practitioners and scholars
across a wide variety of policy domains which are quite diverse and disparate in
institutional and political terms, and in terms of the concrete problem to be addressed.
Yet in each case, the common features which have been identified involve a shift in
emphasis away from command-and-control in favour of 'regulatory' approaches which
are less rigid, less prescriptive, less committed to uniform outcomes, and less
hierarchical in nature.").
5. See Sturm, Architecture of Inclusion, supra note 1, at 268 n.83 ("The
language of 'new governance' scholars includes democratic experimentalism,
empowered participatory governance, a structural approach, legal pragmatism,
reflexive law, and an open method of coordination.").
6. "Weltanshauung" is a word from German philosophy that means "a
comprehensive conception or apprehension of the world especially from a specific
standpoint." MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/weltanschauung (last visited Feb. 1, 2010).
7. See Amy J. Cohen, Governance Legalism: Hayek and Sabel on Reason
and Rules, Organzation and Law, 2010 Wis. L. REV. 357, 387 ("The term 'bracket'
could indicate that new governance architects are unwilling to advocate for particular
social objectives, but they nonetheless believe that through the expansive frameworks of
accountability they design, individuals will use reason to improve organizations and
advance the ends of distributional equity.").
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broad range of stakeholders, or failed to produce positive outcomes;
these contributors judge success on the basis of greater potential
accountability and distributional equity.8 In contrast, other scholars
view many new governance experiments as enabling co-optation,
opportunism, and sham participation, which often lead to an inequitable
distribution of the benefits of reform; these scholars' assessments are
based on their focus on the parties who are excluded from the decision-
making tables of new governance, or who are disempowered in such
deliberations.' A norm of distributive justice does seem to be at the
core of both conclusions. Scholars view a new governance experiment
as promising or troubling because it either enhances or diminishes
participation and redistribution.
If distributive justice is the key normative objective that
distinguishes successful new governance experiments from other more
problematic types of regulatory reform (i.e., command-and-control,
new public management, networked governance, negotiated
rulemaking, or privatization), then the question remains whether the
institutional design of many new governance experiments can be
perfected to better achieve distributive justice. As the Symposium
contributions reveal, many regulatory reform efforts contain new
governance practices, or are cloaked in the language and terminology
of new governance, yet their institutional design fails to achieve this
central normative objective of distributive justice."o These numerous
examples cannot simply be dismissed as aberrations, for they clearly
8. See, e.g., Armstrong & Trubek, supra note 3; Allison Christians,
Networks, Norms, and National Tax Policy, Paper Presented at the University of
Wisconsin Law Review Symposium: Transatlantic Conference on New Governance and
the Transformation of Law (Nov. 20-21, 2009) (on file with author); Joanne Scott &
William H. Simon, The Challenge of Regulating Carbon Offsets (in the European
Union), Paper Presented at the University of Wisconsin Law Review Symposium:
Transatlantic Conference on New Governance and the Transformation of Law (Nov.
20-21, 2009) (on file with author). See also Kathleen G. Noonan, Charles F. Sabel &
William H. Simon, Legal Accountability in the Service-Based Welfare State: Lessons
from Child Welfare Reform, 34 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 523, 524 (2009) (describing
current new governance developments in child welfare as promising improved
performance); Sturm, Architecture of Inclusion, supra note 1, at 271-86 (explaining a
successful new governance project in the area of workplace gender equity).
9. See, e.g., Wendy A. Bach, Governance, Accountability, and the New
Poverty Agenda, 2010 Wis. L. REV. 239, 241-42; Cristie Ford, New Governance in
the Teeth of Human Frailty: Lessons from Financial Regulation, 2010 Wis. L. REV.
441, 443; see also Lisa T. Alexander, Stakeholder Paricipation in New Governance:
Lessons from Chicago's Public Houshig Reform Experiment, 16 GEo. J. ON POVERTY
L. & POL'Y 117, 174-76 (2009) (describing the participation of public housing residents
in Chicago's public housing reform process which failed to empower residents and
equitably distribute the benefits of reform).
10. See sources cited supra note 9.
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incorporate some of new governance theory's principal tenets and
mechanisms, and these experiments are justified by policy-makers and
academics alike in new governance terms.
An institutional design that facilitates meaningful participation and
distributive justice seems to be the key in assessments of whether
regulatory reform efforts that contain new governance elements have
been successful or unsuccessful. As Professor Grdinne de Bilrca
suggests in her contribution to this Symposium, perhaps the necessary
conditions for achieving distributive justice are: "(1) the broadest
possible degree of stakeholder participation compatible with effective
decision-making, and (2) effective and informed monitoring."" But this
definition still leaves us with some important questions. For example,
what rights or legal entitlements are essential elements of the design?
Are procedural rights that can be enforced by courts a necessary
precondition for all new governance experiments, or only for those
experiments where there are substantial power imbalances between
participating stakeholders? Do some experiments also require
substantive rights that provide stakeholders formal legal recourse if a
particular new governance experiment does not distribute resources as
promised? Is resort to courts via consent decrees or enforceable legal
rights a necessary precondition for any new governance experiment to
be successful and to resolve distributional inequities? These questions
raise an additional and related question about what roles lawyers can or
should play in new governance reform experiments to advance
distributive justice.
B. The Role of the Lawyer
While some new governance scholars, particularly in the U.S.,
discuss the role of lawyers in new governance,12 it remains a relatively
underdeveloped aspect of new governance theory. This largely stems
from new governance scholars' view of traditional legal approaches,
such as litigation, arbitration, or hard bargaining, as limited in their
ability to foster cooperation and collaboration or to solve problems.
New governance theorists posit that recent changes in governance
strategies and problem-solving approaches will bring about a
11. Grainne de Bfirca, New Governance and Experimentalism: An
Introduction, 2010 Wis. L. REv. 227, 235.
12. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
13. See Louise G. Trubek, New Governance and Soft Law if Health Care
Reform, 3 IND. HEALTH L. REv. 137, 149 (2006) (explaining that traditional "hard
law" approaches have proved inadequate in many instances and that new governance
approaches allow learning and feedback and create alliances).
2010:737 741
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transformation of law, and of the role of lawyers in society.14 Thus,
new governance proponents avoid placing lawyers in their traditional
roles, instead envisioning them in new roles that substantially depart
from the traditional adversarial model of litigation that is so prevalent
in legal education and in cultural representations of the law.
New governance theorists instead assert that new phenomena-
such as globalization, devolution, decentralization, privatization, and
the growth of the non-profit sector-force lawyers to develop new skills
and to engage in different practices such as collaboration, facilitation,
mediation, data management, compliance, benchmarking, and a host of
other skills.'" These skills and practices are not the classic skills of the
litigator or even of the transactional lawyer. The litigator's role is
usually conceptualized as adversarial, and the transactional lawyer is
often envisioned as a bargainer or a transaction cost engineer.'" New
governance scholars assert that the realities of new governance in
practice require lawyers to develop new capacities, to collaborate with
other professionals, and, thus, to move away from their traditional
roles.
Yet, this shift in the lawyer's role, from adversary to collaborator,
complicates his or her ability to ensure that distributive justice is
occurring in any new governance project. If the lawyer abdicates the
more traditional adversary role, or fails to view litigation as one
alternative tool among many, then it may be difficult for the lawyer to
challenge any power imbalances that exist between stakeholders in any
given new governance reform experiment. Further, if-in favor of
expediency-a new governance experiment intentionally lacks formal
procedural or substantive rights, and contains only non-binding
initiatives, then a lawyer may have insufficient leverage to bolster the
14. See Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Epilogue: Accountability
Without Sovereignty, in LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US 395-96
(Grdinne de Bdrca & Joanne Scott eds., 2006) (defining the "transformation thesis" and
explaining why they are drawn to it); see also de Bilrca & Scott, supra note 4, at 9
("The transformation thesis argues that new governance has demanded, and will
increasingly demand, a re-conceptualisation of our understanding of law and of the role
of lawyers.").
15. For example, as Professor Louise Trubek in her study of the role of public
interest lawyers in recent health care advocacy efforts explains, "[t]he lawyer has
moved from the role of adversary in the legislature, courts, and agencies to a
collaborator engaged in a series of alliances to develop and implement policy." Trubek,
supra note 1, at 586. See also Sturm, Workplace Equity, supra note 1, at 332
(describing "the importance and the promise of lawyers as intermediaries, problem
solvers, institutional designers, and information entrepreneurs").
16. See Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills
and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 243 (1984) (arguing that if what a business
lawyer does has value, "a transaction must be worth more, net of legal fees, as a result
of a lawyer's participation").
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bargaining position of marginalized stakeholders. The most optimistic
new governance scholars envision positive collaboration as an essential
element of new governance practice.' 7 Unfortunately, such scholars
underestimate the extent to which stakeholders in any given reform
experiment may be in conflict regarding the goals of reform. Some new
governance scholars do recognize that lawyers may need to retain some
traditional legal strategies, techniques, or public-law elements in order
to ensure accountability,"8 but even in these accounts formal law
elements are often subordinate to more non-binding and collaborative
practices.
Increasingly, some scholars chide new governance theorists for
their conception of the lawyer as facilitator or collaborator, rather than
as advocate.19 Since furthering distributive justice inherently means
navigating conflicts regarding the allocation of money, goods, benefits,
or power, a lawyer who completely relinquishes his or her adversarial
posture may not have the tools to ensure that distributive justice
occurs.2 0 The new governance elements of collaborative stakeholder
participation may only then serve as a form of sham participation to
legitimate reform projects whose true main objectives are to benefit
powerful interests.
In his article, When New Governance Fails, Professor Douglas
NeJaime argues that the potential pitfalls that cause lawyers who
abdicate their traditional roles for less binding new governance
17. See Jason M. Solomon, Law and Governance in the 21st Century
Regulatory State, 86 TEX. L. REV. 819, 848 (2008) (reviewing LAW AND NEW
GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US (GrAinne de Bfrca & Joanne Scott eds., 2006))
(describing new governance scholarship as having a "vision of collaboration and
inclusive participation").
18. See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information-Forcing Regulation and
Environmental Governance, in LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US
293 (Grdinne de B6rca & Joanne Scott eds., 2006); Sabel & Simon, supra note 3, at
1016; Scott & Sturm, supra note 3, at 571.
19. See NeJaime, supra note 2, at 329 (outlining professional and
representational objections to new governance from a lawyering perspective); see also
Susan D. Carle, Progressive Lawyering in Politically Depressing Times: Can New
Models for lnstitutional Self-Reform Achieve More Effective Structural Change, 30
HARV. J.L. & GENDER 323, 337-38 (2007) (describing problems with the conception of
lawyers in Susan Sturm's study of the University of Michigan's ADVANCE workplace
gender equity reform project program).
20. I make this claim well aware of the limitations of rights themselves in
promoting social justice and social change. Formal legal rights are not sacrosanct and I
am aware of the significant work exploring the limitations of rights. See, e.g., Duncan
Kennedy, The Critique of Rights in Critical Legal Studies, in LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT
CRITIQUE 178 (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002). However, I submit that
participatory rights, and in some cases substantive rights, may help to increase the
accountability of new governance regimes particularly when there are substantial power
inequities between participating stakeholders.
7432010:737
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techniques are so great that new governance approaches should be
viewed not as a totalizing alternative to traditional techniques, but
rather as "a contingent model of cause lawyering that complements,
rather than replaces, other (and specifically litigation-focused)
models." 2' Thus, while lawyers must incorporate new governance
strategies into their arsenal, they cannot fully abandon traditional
techniques or they may be unable to ensure that the benefits of any
reform process are adequately distributed among all stakeholders.
Professor NeJaime's argument essentially favors a hybrid approach
to new governance that gives significant primacy to traditional law
approaches.2 2 The concept of hybridity, as developed by some new
governance scholars, "acknowledges the co-existence and engagement
of [traditional] law and new governance, and explores different ways of
securing their fruitful interaction." 23 As outlined by Grdinne de Birca
and Joanne Scott, hybridity has different dimensions:
fundamental/baseline hybridity, instrumental/developmental hybridity,
and default hybridity.2 4  Scholars whose work exhibits a
fundamental/baseline hybridity approach are most skeptical of the
virtues of an unrestrained form of new governance .25 According to the
fundamental/baseline approach, legal rights and entitlements are
fundamental to any new governance experiment and they provide a
baseline "below which experiments in new governance cannot take
us."2 6 Instrumental hybridity "posits recourse to new governance
techniques as an instrumental means of developing or applying existing
and traditional legal norms." 27 Examples from the EU include legally
binding framework directives that are broad, but binding, and use new
governance processes for their elaboration and implementation.28 in the
case of default hybridity, legal rules represent "a default penalty"
applicable only when the reform experiment fails to conform to its
stated demands and goals.29
In my earlier work, Stakeholder Participation h7 New Governance,
I also asserted that hybrid approaches which give primacy to traditional
21. NeJaime, supra note 2, at 327.
22. See id. at 363 ("In this sense, successful rights-claiming litigation might,
in some ways, be a necessary but not sufficient condition for successful New
Governance practice.").
23. See de Bdirca & Scott, supra note 4, at 6.
24. See id. at 6-9.
25. See id. at 7.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 8.
28. See id.
29. See id. at 9; see also Karkkainen, supra note 18, at 304 (discussing the
concept of the penalty default in environmental regulation).
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legal elements should be used in new governance experiments involving
traditionally marginalized groups.30 Such an approach may empower
traditionally marginalized stakeholders in new governance
deliberations." This suggestion reflects a fundamental baseline
approach to hybridity. A robust role for both procedural and
substantive rights in new governance regimes that involve traditionally
marginalized groups may be necessary for any participating lawyer to
advance an equitable distribution of the benefits of reform. In contrast,
default hybridity is more appropriate when similarly situated
professionals are participating in stakeholder collaborations, or when
parties are equally dependent upon one another, such that meaningful
and equal deliberation is possible.
The more frequent use of fundamental/baseline hybridity in new
governance experiments that involve traditionally marginalized groups
will require lawyers to use a broader range of legal strategies depending
on the dynamics of a given reform experiment. Initially, perhaps, soft-
law32 approaches consistent with new governance practice can be used,
but there must be a backdrop of both participatory rights and perhaps in
some cases substantive rights, which lawyers or stakeholders can
enforce if participatory and distributional inequities arise during the
process. Under this conception, new governance approaches do not
transform our understanding of traditional law; rather, traditional law is
used to transform new governance practices and to help new
governance experiments ensure full and fair participation and
distributional equity.
Even though fundamental baseline hybridity approaches may be of
great help in new governance experiments that involve traditionally
disempowered groups, there may be some problems that simply cannot
be remediated through new governance techniques. Perhaps the power
imbalances between participating stakeholders are so significant that the
kind of empowered collaborative participatory deliberation idealized in
much new governance jurisprudence is simply not possible. Perhaps the
conflict between the participating parties and individuals is too great for
meaningful participatory deliberation. Unhappily, as new governance
approaches become increasingly popular in regulatory reform, it
becomes more difficult to shield any problem-solving process from new
governance methods and elements. It also becomes increasingly
difficult to ensure that the institutional design of any given new
30. See Alexander, supra note 9, at 185.
31. See id. at 123.
32. See David M. Trubek et al., "Soft Law, " "Hard Law," and EU
Integradon, in LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US 65 (Grdinne de
Bfirca & Joanne Scott eds., 2006) (defining "soft law" as non-binding directives).
2010:737 745
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governance experiment, and the lawyers who support and implement it,
are oriented towards distributive justice. As private lawyers supporting
profit-maximizing organizations become increasingly involved in new
governance reform, their professional orientation may cause them to
maximize the gains of their clients even at the expense of other
stakeholders. While new governance jurisprudence may require that
new governance experiments strive for distributive justice, ensuring
that such conditions are manifest in actual new governance practice
proves more difficult. Therefore, a hybrid approach that gives primacy
to some traditional and substantive rights-claiming strategies may be
necessary to promote distributive justice.
C The Implications for Legal Education
These insights have significant implications for legal education.
The proliferation of new governance approaches-in the U.S. and the
EU, and in a variety of policy arenas-requires that law students
become consciously aware of these changes in governance and the
power dynamics implicated by these changes. Thus, for new lawyers to
be "prepared" in the world of new governance, law students must
understand power. This assertion is somewhat antithetical to long-
standing approaches to teaching law in the academy. A large majority
of first-year law students are subtly inculcated with the idea that law is
an ahistorical and apolitical endeavor.33 The law is above politics. Legal
issues can be decided on neutral principles irrespective of the operation
of power. Thus, law students early on are subtly encouraged to ignore
power.34
Yet, as new governance practice increases the number of
stakeholders who may participate in, shape, and determine regulatory
goals or problem-solving strategies, power is bound to manifest itself in
increasingly complex and unpredictable ways. Law students who will
encounter new governance in operation must be trained to identify and
to understand how power can operate to undermine representation,
honest engagement, or meaningful deliberation. Law students, then,
must be taught to recognize power and to respond to it. They must be
33. See David Kairys, Introduction to THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE
CRITIQUE 1, 1 (David Kairys ed., 1990) ("Law is depicted as separate from-and
'above'-politics, economics, culture, and the values and preferences of judges.").
34. See Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education as Training for Hierarchy, in THE
POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 38, 45 (David Kairys ed., 1990) ("The bias
arises because law school teaching makes the choice of hierarchy and domination,
which is implicit in the adoption of the rules of property, contract, and tort, look as




taught traditional legal techniques as well as new governance
approaches, and they must learn how to combine and integrate these
techniques to mitigate power struggles and to enhance meaningful
collaboration. Prior to practice, law students should be given the
opportunity to study and to analyze which legal approaches mitigate
power imbalances and promote distributional equity in social reform.
Law students should also learn to become aware of how their own
power and social positionality affects their representation of clients and
causes and their framing of legal and non-legal issues.
All of this is easier said than done.35 It is difficult to envision how
to explicitly teach about power within the confines of a three-year legal
education. Yet, philosophical and sociological writings about power can
be incorporated into traditional curricula in much the same way that
theoretical work about law and economics has been incorporated into
business and contract law case books. Such readings cannot simply be
relegated to courses on the sociology of law, jurisprudence, or new
governance. A relational and interdisciplinary approach to teaching law
is also critical to prepare students to operate in a new governance
regime.
The relational approach would require law professors to
increasingly incorporate cases, case studies, problem sets, and
newspaper articles that illustrate the interrelationships among different
doctrinal areas of law-particularly those areas of law that are normally
viewed by lawyers, professors, and students alike as antithetical,
unrelated, or disconnected. For example, to be prepared to operate in a
new governance regime, professors must help students see connections
between business law and public interest law. Business students must
learn to view non-profits, cooperatives, LC3s, and a variety of other
business and ownership structures as "part of business law." Legal
services lawyers should be encouraged to take tax, bankruptcy, and
corporate law. Current events often provide such examples, if one
looks broadly enough at the scope of what is relevant to a given course.
Both an inter- and intra-disciplinary approach to legal education is
also necessary. As lawyers in new governance collaborations are
increasingly forced to collaborate with a wide range of professionals
working on multidisciplinary problems such as climate change, energy
policy, international investments, health care, and educational and
housing reform, lawyers must learn to work with professionals from
other disciplines. Many law schools are increasingly embracing
interdisciplinarity in their clinical and non-clinical courses. But to
prepare lawyers for new governance regimes, law schools must also
35. Notably, in my experience, many law students resist the engagement with
complexity that this form of education requires.
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embrace intradisciplinarity. Within the field of law itself, specialization
has caused law students to view various legal approaches in rather rigid
and limited ways. Students believe that if they seek a career as a
litigator that they must take certain courses at the exclusion of others.
Similarly, students interested in transactional practice are often
encouraged to define business narrowly and to take courses that lead to
work in a large law firm. However, transactional lawyers are used in a
variety of domains. In a new governance regime, the same lawyer must
be able to exercise multiple legal skills. The hyper-specialization that
currently exists in legal education presents a problem for lawyers who
will operate in a new governance world. Perhaps legal educators need
to recognize these realities and realign legal education with these
changing dynamics.
CONCLUSION
This Afterword only begins to illuminate the important questions
that new governance scholars will need to confront as they further
conceptualize the role of the lawyer in new governance. New
governance scholarship calls out for more in-depth analysis and studies
of the role of the lawyer on the ground in new governance practice. If
distributive justice is the normative core of new governance
jurisprudence and practice, then more thought must be given to how
lawyers can advance that goal. This Afterword asserts that lawyers
cannot advance the goal of distributive justice in a new governance
world by substantially relinquishing their traditional roles. Yet, clearly,
new governance in operation will require lawyers to develop new skills
and to learn to integrate those new skills with the old skills in a manner
that enhances each.
748
